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Abstract
As demonstrated by neuroimaging data, the human brain contains systems that control
responses to threat. The revised Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of personality predicts that
individual differences in the reactivity of these brain systems produce anxiety and fear-related
personality traits. Here we discuss some of the challenges in testing this theory and, as an exam-
ple, present a pilot study that aimed to dissociate brain activity during pursuit by threat and goal
conflict. We did this by translating theMouse Defense Test Battery for human fMRI use. In this
version, dubbed the Joystick Operated Runway Task (JORT), we repeatedly exposed 24 partic-
ipants to pursuit and goal conflict, with and without threat of electric shock. The runway design
of JORT allowed the effect of threat distance on brain activation to be evaluated independently
of context. Goal conflict plus threat of electric shock caused deactivation in a network of brain
areas that included the fusiform and middle temporal gyri, as well as the default mode network
core, includingmedial frontal regions, precuneus and posterior cingulate gyrus, and laterally the
inferior parietal and angular gyri. Consistent with earlier research, we also found that imminent
threat activated the midbrain and that this effect was significantly stronger during the simple
pursuit condition than during goal conflict. Also consistent with earlier research, we found sig-
nificantly greater hippocampal activation during goal conflict than pursuit by imminent threat.
In conclusion, our results contribute knowledge to theories linking anxiety disorders to altered
functioning in defensive brain systems and also highlight challenges in this research domain.
Establishing a causal neuroscience-based theory of human personality is a scientific challenge
for multiple reasons. One part of the challenge relates to the tendency for early work to be done
in rodents, creating the difficulty of extrapolating findings to humans. Nowhere is this clearer
than in what could be termed the “experiment-knowledge problem”, which arises because
rodents are unaware that they are in an experiment, whereas human volunteers know the sit-
uation is artificial. This problem is particularly marked in studies of defensive behaviour:
because threat is required for such experiments to be meaningful, yet the informed consent
process ensures that human subjects know no harm will come to them – this is quite unlike
a naturalistic setting. Such human awareness raises questions about the extent to which findings
are comparable to those of rodent studies that entail (perceived) life-and-death situations.
A second part of the challenge relates to differing demand characteristics of experiments
seeking to delineate general neural processes versus those seeking to investigate individual
differences in the functioning of those processes. The former are best served by powerful stimuli
so that behaviour is homogenized, thus providing maximum statistical power. The latter require
mild stimuli so that individual differences in responses (heterogeneity) can be detected. This is
illustrated by the concept of “defensive distance”, which represents a psychological construct of
perceived threat intensity (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1989; Gray & McNaughton, 2000;
McNaughton & Corr, 2004). According to this concept, individuals with a short perceived
defensive distance respond to distant threats as if they are closer, whereas individuals with a
long perceived defensive distance will respond to close threats as if they are more distant
(see Table 1, adapted from Corr & Perkins, 2006).
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The notion that there exists a continuum of perceived defensive
distance is a powerful unifying principle for the neuroscience of
personality because there is evidence that neuroticism reflects, in
part at least, individual differences along this continuum
(Perkins, Arnone, Smallwood, & Mobbs, 2015). Mundane objects
or situations that are regarded as innocuous by average individuals
will be viewed as threatening by individuals with a short perceived
defensive distance, causing them to live their lives in a near-constant
state of negative emotionality – that is, to be neurotic. This insight
explains why high scores on neuroticism are a risk factor for all
forms of psychiatric illness (Claridge & Davis, 2001; De Moor
et al., 2015, Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, &Watson, 2010) and suggests
that research which conclusively delineates the neural basis of
neuroticism is likely to have considerable clinical significance.
Perceived defensive distance is, however, of little use if it cannot
be operationalized in an experimental setting. A practical option in
humans is to vary threat distance at a fixed threat intensity via a
task resembling a computer game. This option has been pioneered
successfully in research showing a shift in neural activity from fore-
brain (ventromedial prefrontal cortex) to midbrain (periaqueduc-
tal gray; PAG) as threat moves closer (Mobbs et al., 2007, 2009,
2010). The Joystick Operated Runway Task (JORT; Figure 1a)
has been used to explore this topic from the perspective of individ-
ual differences. JORT is a translation of the Mouse Defense Test
Battery (MDTB; Griebel, Sanger, & Perrault, 1997), which allows
alternating exposure to pursuit and goal conflict. It shows that neu-
roticism scores correlate positively with flight intensity, suggesting
that neuroticism does indeed reflect individual differences in per-
ceived defensive distance (Perkins et al., 2013).
A second major concept in the emerging neuroscience of
individual differences in human defense is defensive direction,
which posits that anxiety is elicited by threats that must be
approached (i.e., that generate goal conflict), whereas fear is elic-
ited by threats that need not be approached (i.e., that do not gen-
erate goal conflict; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton &
Corr, 2004). Key to this concept is the septo-hippocampal system
which is hypothesized to act as a negatively weighted comparator,
typically selecting the least risky option as the correct course of
action during goal conflict. Evidence for this concept has been
provided by rodent studies, which have guided its development
(Gray & McNaughton, 2000).
Testing the defensive direction theory in humans is at an early
stage, and evidence so far is mixed. The strongest evidence for the
concept of defensive direction has so far come from studies of
threat-related facial expressions. In both UK and Brazilian sub-
jects, scenarios featuring threats that need not be approached elic-
ited a facial expression that was recognized by naïve observers as
representing fear. In contrast, scenarios featuring ambiguously
threatening situations (entailing goal conflict) elicited a risk-
assessing facial expression labeled as representing anxiety
(Borges, Ferrer-Rosa, Juruena, & Estanislau, 2018; Perkins,
Inchley-Mort, Pickering, Corr, & Burgess, 2012).
Data from drug studies with JORT are partially supportive
of the defensive direction concept: risk assessment intensity
(forwards-backwards oscillation elicited by avoid-avoid goal
conflict) was modulated by the anxiolytic drug lorazepam, but
only in individuals with low trait anxiety, as if the drug was insuf-
ficient to affect the behaviour of high-anxious individuals
(Perkins et al., 2009, 2013). Concurrently, in the 2013 study, lor-
azepam modulated simple avoidance behaviour in interaction
with personality. It reduced flight intensity in participants with
high fight–flight–freeze (FFF) sensitivity but increased flight
intensity in participants with low FFF sensitivity (as measured
by the Tissue Damage Fear scale of the Fear Survey Schedule;
Wolpe & Lang, 1977).
This apparent conundrum presented by the dual effect of lor-
azepam might be explained by referring to the aforementioned
“experiment-knowledge problem”. In this case, the defensive direc-
tion theory dictates that, unlike rodents, human subjects who vol-
unteer to participate in an experiment involving noxious stimuli
are exposed to an approach-avoidance goal conflict because they
are approaching a threat. This means the experiment is inherently
anxiety-generating; hence antianxiety drugs should have a global
effect on behaviour throughout the experiment, even in trial types
that contain no explicit goal conflict, such as the simple avoidance
phase of JORT.
These considerations do not necessarily mean that individual
trial types within the human experiment are meaningless; rather,
it suggests that a specific trial type containing goal conflict will have
less scope to show an anxiety effect if the experiment already is a
(albeit implicit) goal conflict. In practice, a smaller distinction
might be found in human experiments between activity in the
brain systems that govern simple avoidance and goal conflict than
is clearly evident in rodent experiments. However, wemust be wary
of the perils of post hoc justifications for predictive failure. This
possibility constitutes yet another challenge in neuroscientific
models of personality.
In this paper we describe a small-scale pilot study that makes an
initial attempt at dissociating neural activity of these systems in
humans.We used an fMRI-compatible version of JORT as it allows
within-subjects dissociation of neural responses to simple avoid-
ance and goal conflict. Moreover, the task has been proved to be
sensitive to drugs with clinical effectiveness for anxiety disorders
in both rodent and human versions (Griebel, Perrault, & Sanger,
1998; Perkins et al., 2009, 2013; Stemmelin et al., 2008).
Based on previous research (Mobbs et al., 2007, 2009, 2010), we
predicted an increase in the activation of PAG during pursuit by
imminent threat, and the anterior hippocampus during goal con-
flict (Ito & Lee, 2016). We also explored relationships between
brain activation and self-reported negative affect to investigate
neural processes underpinning individual differences in neuroti-
cism. This is a clinically important issue because high scores on
neuroticism increase the risk of psychiatric illness (Claridge &
Davis, 2001; De Moor et al., 2015; Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, &
Watson, 2010). As part of this second aim, we predicted that
neuroticism scores would modulate hippocampal activity, since
rodent data link anxiety to hippocampal activity (Gray &
McNaughton, 2000).
Table 1. Relationship between perceived defensive distance and real distance
to threat
System state (i.e.,
personality) Defensive distance
Real distance sufficient to
elicit reaction
High defensive
individual
Perceived distance <
actual distance
Long
Normal defensive
individual
Perceived
distance = actual
distance
Medium
Low defensive
individual
Perceived distance >
actual distance
Short
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Participants and methods
Twenty-four healthy participants (11 male, 13 female; mean age
25.2, SD ± 5.6) completed the study. All were right-handed, with
normal or corrected vision. Participants gave written informed
consent, and the study was approved by the King’s College
Hospital Research Ethics Committee.
During JORT, participants viewed a computer monitor display-
ing a runway (Figure 1b). In pursuit trials (Figure 1c), they used a
joystick to move a green dot cursor along it, fast enough to stay
ahead of a pursuing red dot cursor. The joystick was force-sensing:
the greater the force that participants applied to the handle, the
faster the green dot cursor moved along the runway. In 50% of pur-
suit trials, a lightening icon was displayed in the corner of the
screen (Figure 1d), signifying that if the red dot cursor touched
the green dot cursor, the participant would receive an electric
shock (threat condition). JORT delivers electric shocks to the right
foot using a custom-built fMRI-compatible electrical stimulator.
Each participant chose a shock level they found annoying but
not painful, from a choice of eight levels (maximum 80 volts at
20 mA).
Goal conflict trials replicated pursuit trials except that a second
red dot traveled ahead of the green dot at a constant velocity
(Figure 1e), requiring the participant to move the green dot cursor
fast enough to avoid the pursuing red dot cursor, but not so fast
that it collided with the leading red dot cursor. In 50% of goal con-
flict trials, the lightening icon was visible, signifying the participant
would receive an electric shock if either of the red dot cursors
touched the green dot cursor (Figure 1f).
To enhance unpredictability, trials were presented in a pseudo-
random order (i.e., each participant was presented with the same
predetermined order of trials that appeared randomly shuffled),
and inter-trial intervals were varied pseudo-randomly between
15 and 30 seconds. During inter-trial intervals, the runway
remained on screen with the green dot cursor visible: no red dot
cursors were visible. Trials terminated if the participant received
an electric shock. However, even if a trial terminated early, the next
trial did not start early. This prevented participants from acceler-
ating the experiment by trying to get caught quickly. If the partici-
pant successfully maneuvered the green dot cursor for 7 seconds,
the trial automatically terminated.
The force-sensing joystick apparatus (PH-JS14-MRI; Psyal,
London, UK; Figure 1) resembles a grip-strength dynamometer
and allows participants to compress three 60-mL plastic syringes
using their right hand. The center syringe was sealed and acted
B
Removable doors used in the closed runway test
0.4 m
2 m
A C
D
E
F
Figure 1. (A) The Mouse Defense Test Battery. (B) The Joystick Operated Runway Task. A force-sensing interface controls the speed of a green dot cursor pursued along a runway
by a red dot cursor capable of inflicting electric shock. The task comprised 12 trials each of pursuit (C), pursuit plus threat of electric shock (D), goal conflict (E), goal conflict plus
threat of electric shock (F). Illustration by Nick Boon.
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as a return spring. The other syringes were connected by plastic
tubing to a transducer that generated digital signals from changes
in air pressure caused by changes in grip force. The digital signals
controlled the speed of the green dot cursor along the runway. The
force required to keep the green dot cursor ahead of the red dot
cursor was set at 7.5 kg, as pilot testing showed that participants
could generate 7.5 kg with one hand for the duration of forty-eight
7-second trials without suffering noticeable fatigue. To further
minimize fatigue, participants were instructed to squeeze the joy-
stick handle only when the red dot cursor was on screen – this
meant that the participant would be squeezing the handle for a
maximum of 336 seconds, spread over the 17-minute duration
of the task. Participants practiced with JORT prior to undergoing
MRI scanning until they successfully completed each of the four
trial types. This ensured that all participants began theMRI session
with approximately equal proficiency at operating JORT.
Participants completed the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire–
Revised (EPQ-R; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991) which conceptualizes
neuroticism as individual differences in proneness to negative
emotions of all kinds (Eysenck, 1967). At the end of the scanning
session, participants rated the degree of dread they experienced
when the red dot cursor was chasing them, with 1 representing
no dread and 10 representing maximum dread.
Blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) fMRI data were
acquired on a 3T GE MR750 system (GE Medical Systems,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin). T2*-weighted gradient echo planar
images (EPIs) were acquired every 2 seconds (repetition time) with
an isotropic 3 × 3 mm in-plane resolution. The echo time was
30 milliseconds, the flip angle was 75°, and the matrix size was
64 × 64 voxels. Whole-brain coverage was achieved with 39 slices
(slice thickness 3 mm, inter-slice gap 0.3 mm); 540 whole-brain
volumes were acquired in total. Additionally, a whole-brain high-
resolution sagittal Magnetization Prepared Rapid Acquisition
GRE 3D Inversion Recovery (MP-RAGE) structural scan was
acquired with an inversion time of 400 milliseconds, an echo time
of 3.016 milliseconds, repetition time of 7.312 seconds, and a flip
angle of 11°. The volume consisted of 196 contiguous slices with
a slice thickness of 1.2 mm. Data quality was assured using an
automated quality control procedure (Simmons, Moore, &
Williams, 1999).
EPI data were pre-processed with version 8 of Statistical
Parametric Mapping package (SPM8, revision 4667; http://www.
fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/) running in MATLAB 7.2.0
(The MathWorks, Inc., 2006). The fMRI time series was first cor-
rected for slice timing differences, then realigned to correct for vol-
ume-to-volume head motion with a cut-off of 3 mm (i.e., one
voxel). The image time series was normalized to template space
via unified segmentation of the MP-RAGE structural image.
Finally, the normalized data were spatially smoothed using an
8-mm full-width at half maximum kernel.
Data were analyzed under the SPM8 general linear model. For
each participant, a separate fixed-effects analysis was conducted
and involved building a model with four regressors encoding
onset and offset of 12 trials for each JORT condition (i.e., pursuit
trials without threat of potential shock; pursuit trials with threat
of potential shock; conflict trials without threat of potential
shock; and finally conflict trials with the threat of potential
shock). The resultant box-car time series was convolved with
the canonical hemodynamic response function. Additionally, a
parametric modulator encoding peak threat (i.e., the peak value
of the inverse distance from the pursuer) was added for each
condition, resulting in a total of eight regressors. Six regressors
encoding the volume-to-volume motion (translations and rota-
tions) were also included in the model as regressors of no interest
to control for signal intensity variation resulting from participant
head movement.
The primary contrasts were the task conditions compared to the
implicit baseline-resting condition. In addition to task activation,
contrasts for parametric modulators were created. Following
parameter estimation, these contrasts of beta-coefficients were
taken forward to group-level random-effects analyses. These mod-
els included: (i) a 2 × 2 repeated-measures factorial ANOVA
including four contrast images per participant (e.g., four activation
contrasts, or contrasts for each of the peak threat parametric mod-
ulators); and (ii) regression models exploring the relationship
between individual differences response (i.e., beta-coefficients)
in a given condition and post-scan ratings of subjective dread dur-
ing exposure to the red dot cursor as well as questionnaire data on
trait individual differences in proneness to negative emotions (i.e.,
EPQ neuroticism scores). Age was included as a nuisance covariate
in all group-level models.
As this is the first fMRI JORT study, we characterized task-
related activations and deactivations, then the main effects of
Threat versus No Threat, and separately Pursuit versus Conflict.
Finally, we tested for brain regions where activity is influenced
by an interaction of these two factors (i.e., threat of electric shock
and number of pursuers). For these exploratory whole-brain analy-
ses, Gaussian random field theory was employed for determining
thresholds for multiple-comparison correction. Significance was
defined as results surviving family-wise error (FWE) correction
for multiple comparisons based on cluster extent (p < 0.05) given
a default cluster-forming threshold of p < 0.001.
Our a priori interests were in the sensitivity of PAG to pursing
threat and conflict sensitivity of the anterior hippocampi. Regions
of interest (ROIs) defining these structures were generated inde-
pendently of the data to avoid circularity (Kriegeskorte,
Simmons, Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009). The hippocampal ROIs were
bilateral anatomical masks generated from the automatic anatomi-
cal labeling atlas with the WFU-Pickatlas toolbox (Wake Forest
University). As we are not aware of anatomically defined masks
for PAG, our ROI for this brainstem region was defined as a sphere
with a 6-mm-radius centering on the PAG peak previously linked
to the processing of threat proximity (x= 4, y=−30, z=−24),
using the Montreal Neurological Institute space (Mobbs et al.,
2010). These hypotheses were tested using small-volume correc-
tion with significance defined as results surviving peak-level
FWE correction (p < 0.05). The same ROI was also used to extract
mean threat-related BOLD signal fromPAG for subsequent regres-
sion analyses.
Results
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlations between
behavioural criteria, self-reported negative affect, and number of
electric shocks received by the participants. Neuroticism scores
were significantly negatively correlated with the number of electric
shocks received, and dread ratings were significantly positively cor-
related with the number of electric shocks. Female participants, on
average, chose a significantly lower level of electric shock com-
pared withmales and, unlikemales, displayed a significant negative
correlation between neuroticism and the level of electric shock
selected. There were no significant positive correlations between
affective measures and the intensity of either form of threat avoid-
ance behaviour.
4 Personality Neuroscience
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Main effects
A main effect of Condition (i.e., conflict > pursuit) occurred in a
large bilateral network extending into the frontal and parietal, pre-
motor and supplementary motor areas, the cerebellum, and insula
bilaterally (Table 3). The main effect of Condition (pursuit > con-
flict) was also present as significantly greater activation in the supe-
rior and middle frontal gyri and the inferior parietal lobule
extending into the angular gyrus. We found no main effect of
the threat of receiving an electric shock.
Interaction
A significant Condition × Threat interaction was observed in the
fusiform andmiddle temporal gyri (Table 3) and brain regions typ-
ically characterized as the default mode network (i.e., medial fron-
tal regions, precuneus and posterior cingulate gyrus, and laterally
the inferior parietal and angular gyri). The main cluster peaks
occurred in the medial prefrontal gyrus (B), the inferior occipital
gyrus (C), the angular gyrus (D), and the precuneus (E; Figure 2).
The effects at these sites were driven by increased deactivation dur-
ing the trials containing goal conflict plus threat of electric shock,
except for the effects in the inferior occipital gyrus which were
driven primarily by increased activation during the trials contain-
ing goal conflict.
Hypothesis testing: hippocampal activation by goal conflict
There was a significant, small-volume-corrected interaction (see
Figure 3a, 3b) in the right (p= 0.008, z-score= 4.14; 105 voxels
[32, −14, −12]) and left (p= 0.045, z-score = 3.52; 25 voxels
[−24, −8, −18]) anterior hippocampi. This indicated significant
deactivation in the anterior hippocampi during all trial types rel-
ative to implicit baseline-resting condition, except during trials
containing goal conflict, when there was significant activation.
Similar patterns occurred in the midbrain (encompassing several
nuclei including PAG; p= 0.011, z-score = 3.35 [8, −30, −32])
and, although non-hypothesized, such patterns of interaction were
also evident within the right (p= 0.003, z-score= 4.05; 67 voxels
[30, −8, −12]) and left (p= 0.016, z-score = 3.47; 24 voxels
[−24, −6, −18]) amygdalae.
Hypothesis testing: trial-to-trial threat proximity and
the midbrain
In order to explore the effect on brain activity of trial-to-trial
differences in threat proximity (i.e., the inverse of the minimal dis-
tance between the green dot cursor and red dot cursor or cursors in
each trial), we examined this separately for pursuit plus threat of
electric shock and goal conflict plus threat of electric shock. We
found that BOLD signal in a midbrain location encompassing sev-
eral nuclei, including PAG (Figure 3c, 3d), varied on a trial-by-trial
basis with the measure of threat proximity (i.e., trial peak threat
level) during pursuit plus threat of electric shock (p < 0.01, z-score
= 3.31; 69 voxels [6, −28, −28]): activation was the highest when
the threat was closest during this trial type. Follow-up testing found
that the same region showed a trend towards significantly greater
threat proximity-related responses during the task condition con-
taining pursuit plus threat of electric shock, compared to pursuit
without threat of electric shock (p= 0.10, z-score= 2.09; 14 voxels
[6, −28, −28]).
Regression analysis
We explored the relationship between task-related BOLD
responses during goal conflict trials plus threat of electric shock,
individual differences in state dread, and EPQ neuroticism
(Table 4). Dread scores were significantly negatively correlated
with BOLD responses in the right inferior operculum and middle
frontal gyrus [32, 12, 34] (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [DLPFC];
Figure 4a, 4b). EPQ neuroticism scores correlated negatively with
BOLD responses in the superior and middle temporal gyri [52,
−12, 8] (Figure 4c, 4d). A hypothesis-driven ROI analysis showed
EPQ neuroticism scores negatively correlated with BOLD activity
in the left hippocampus (p= 0.019, z-score = 3.74; 50 voxels [−22,
−22, −16]) during conflict trials under threat of shock (Figure 4e,
4f). Dread scores were significantly positively correlated with task-
related activity in a cluster in the operculum extending to the insula
[48, 8,−12] pursuit trials under threat (whole brain; Figure 4g, 4h).
Finally, we assessed the degree to which dread scores associated
with midbrain threat sensitivity (i.e., the degree to which trial-
to-trial variation in midbrain activity tracked with trial-to-trial
variation in peak threat [i.e., threat proximity]). We found a
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations for self-reported negative affect and behavioural criteria
Variable Overall mean (SD) Male mean (SD) Female mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Neuroticism 8.92 (6.87) 9.09 (6.93) 8.77 (7.07) − −.017 .166 .258 −.045 −.442
−.702** .293 .114 −.164 −.590*
2. Level of electric shock 4.63 (1.24)** 5.45 (1.21) 3.92 (0.76) −.222 − −.456 .131 −.026 −.286
−.277 −.222 −.006 .564*
3. Dread ratings 4.29 (2.35) 3.82 (2.18) 4.69 (2.50) .231 −.392 − .365 .599 .694*
−.024 −.117 .310
4. Flight intensity −0.12 (0.87) −0.37 (1.11) 0.10 (0.57) .178 −.144 .231 − .797** .103
.251 −.479
5. Risk assessment intensity −0.02 (0.12) −0.05 (0.16) −0.00 (0.08) −.087 −.128 .311 .685** − .375
.247
6. Number of electric shocks 2.17 (2.24) 1.36 (1.96) 2.85 (2.30) −.505* −.133 .486* −.026 .334 −
Note. Correlations for the whole sample (n= 24) in the lower left half of the matrix; correlations for males (n= 11, upper) and females (n= 13, lower) in the upper right half of the matrix.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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significant main effect of condition (i.e., pursuit > conflict) by
covariate (i.e., dread) interaction, F(1,20) = 8.549, p= 0.008. Post
hoc one-tailed correlational analyses demonstrated that when con-
trolling for age, PAG threat sensitivity was weakly correlated (par-
tial correlation coefficient= 0.325, p= 0.065), but the ANCOVA
effect was predominantly driven by the relationship between dread
scores and midbrain threat sensitivity during pursuit under threat
(partial correlation coefficient= 0.441, p= 0.018) with a non-sig-
nificant effect in pursuit trials without threat of electric shock (par-
tial correlation coefficient= 0.266, p= 0.110).
Discussion
We used JORT to attempt a within-subjects dissociation of brain
activity in healthy humans during pursuit and goal conflict. Our
over-arching aim in this study was to provide a neuroimaging test
of the revised Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory’s principles of
defensive distance and direction (Gray & McNaughton, 2000;
McNaughton & Corr, 2004). We also sought to begin exploring
whether the “experiment-knowledge problem” is a major issue
in a study of this type. This refers to the knowledge of human sub-
jects that they are approaching threat by volunteering themselves
Table 3. Main effects and Condition × Threat interactions
Brain region Side Cluster size z-score
MNI coordinates
X Y X
Pursuit > Conflict
Superior frontal gyrus Left 2138 6.14 −12 38 54
Superior frontal gyrus Left 5.36 −22 24 58
Middle frontal gyrus Left 5.19 −42 12 52
Angular gyrus Left 637 5.33 −40 −70 44
Inferior parietal lobule Left 4.94 −50 −60 44
Superior temporal gyrus Left 4.94 −40 −58 26
Conflict > Pursuit
Paracentral gyrus Left 24266 7.83 −18 −10 66
Superior frontal gyrus Right 7.8 26 −2 58
Supplementary motor area Left 6.81 −2 −10 64
Cerebellar vermis (8) Right 7855 7.53 4 −72 −36
Cerebellar vermis (6) Right 5.86 26 −54 −26
Anterior cerebellar lobe Right 5.68 6 −58 −24
Insula Right 1196 6.28 38 20 −4
Insula Left 713 4.94 −32 18 −8
Condition × Threat interaction (deactivation occurred in the trials containing goal conflict plus threat of electric shock, except in the inferior occipital gyrus
which showed increased activation during the trials containing goal conflict)
Medial prefrontal gyrus Left 2785 5.25 −10 66 16
Superior medial frontal gyrus Medial 4.73 0 66 8
Middle frontal gyrus Left 4.49 −28 60 12
Inferior occipital gyrus Left 6304 4.88 −42 −78 −6
Fusiform gyrus Left 4.5 −40 −62 −14
Middle occipital gyrus Right 4.39 36 −84 0
Angular gyrus Left 1275 4.54 −48 −54 28
Inferior parietal lobule Left 4.29 −50 −58 40
Middle temporal gyrus Left 4.13 −34 −66 26
Frontal pole Right 399 4.16 30 50 0
Anterior cingulate gyrus Right 3.91 20 42 10
Frontal pole Right 3.46 26 64 6
Precuneus Medial 934 3.89 0 −56 26
Posterior cingulate gyrus Left 3.73 −2 −40 26
Precuneus Right 3.89 2 −60 34
Note. Cluster information formain effects and task Condition× Threat interactions. All regions survive whole-brain family-wise error correction on the basis of cluster extent (pFWE< 0.05) with a
default cluster-forming threshold of p < 0.001. Main cluster peaks are shown in bold. MNI=Montreal Neurological Institute.
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to receive foot-shocks. This situation sets up a goal conflict that
risks generating intrinsic anxiety which in turn may reduce the vis-
ibility of any task-specific anxiety induction.
Congruent with the notion that high scores on neuroticism
reflect a magnified perception of threat (Gray & McNaughton,
2000), we found a significant negative correlation between neuroti-
cism scores and the number of electric shocks received: it seems the
higher participants scored on neuroticism, the more motivated
they are to avoid threat. We also found a significant positive cor-
relation between the number of electric shocks received and dread
ratings, suggesting that experiencing electric shocks was
unpleasant.
In addition to brain activation produced by visual and motor
demands of the task, there was a significant main effect of condi-
tion, suggesting that the pursuit and goal conflict JORT conditions
were sufficiently different to activate the brain differently.
There was no significant main effect of threat, most likely
because participants’ neuroticism scores on average were approx-
imately one standard deviation below normal (Perkins, Cooper,
Abdelall, Smillie, & Corr, 2010). Had we been able to test a full
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Figure 2. (A) Statistical parametric maps illustrating blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) responses for the Condition × Threat interaction. (B) Parameter estimates for activity
in the medial prefrontal gyrus [−10, 66, 16]; (C) inferior occipital gyrus [−42, −78, −6]; (D) angular gyrus [0, −56, 26]; (E) precuneus [−48, −54, 28]. All regions survive whole-brain
family-wise error correction on the basis of cluster extent (pFWE < 0.05) with a default cluster-forming threshold of p < 0.001. Error bars represent 1 SEM.
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range of scorers on neuroticism, we might have found threat of
electric shock causing a main effect on brain activation – this
range-restriction factor means that any interpretations of neuroti-
cism findings in the present study must be regarded as tentative.
Another factor may have been that participants chose the intensity
of electric shocks so they might have been unpleasant but perhaps
not threatening. In an earlier study (Kumari, Das, Wilson,
Goswami, & Sharma, 2007), participants were told that the shock
they would receive while in the scanner would be of the same inten-
sity they chose or stronger (but did not deliver them). However, we
did find a condition × threat interaction: the default mode network
(DMN; Raichle et al., 2001) deactivated during goal conflict plus
threat of electric shock. Since these two attributes make this trial
type the most demanding in attentional terms, this finding fits
the notion that DMN ismost active when the environment is unsti-
mulating and least active when the environment demands focused
attention.
We had two hypothesized results: first, we found a significant
positive association between threat proximity and activity in a part
of the midbrain encompassing several nuclei, including PAG.
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Figure 3. (A) Statistical parametric map illustrating blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) responses in the anterior hippocampi during the goal conflict condition (shown at an
uncorrected voxel threshold of p < 0.005 for display purposes). (B) Parameter estimates for activity in the right anterior hippocampus [32, −14, −12] during the four task con-
ditions. (C) BOLD responses in the periaqueductal gray (PAG) at the point of peak threat proximity during pursuit plus threat of electric shock (shown at an uncorrected voxel
threshold p < 0.01 for display purposes). (D) Mean BOLD activity in PAG for the task conditions [6 −28 −28]. Error bars represent 1 SEM; the y-axis displays beta values that reflect
scaling factors for the peak threat value to fit the residual after fitting the mean.
Table 4. Regression analyses
Region label Laterality Cluster size z-Score
MNI coordinates
X Y X
Dread vs. Conflict (w. Threat)
DLPFC* Right 373 4.42 32 12 34
Middle frontal gyrus Right 3.94 38 6 30
Middle frontal gyrus Right 3.65 42 32 26
EPQ vs. Conflict (w. Threat)
Superior temporal gyrus Right 457 4.42 52 −12 8
Middle temporal gyrus Right 3.67 62 −8 −6
Note. Cluster information for brain regionswhere conflict-related blood oxygenation level-dependent activity, under the threat of shock, was significantly correlatedwith subjective dread scores
and Eysenck Personality Questionnaire scores. All regions survive whole-brain family-wise error correction on the basis of cluster extent (pFWE< 0.05) with a default cluster-forming threshold of
p < 0.001. Main cluster peaks are shown in bold. MNI=Montreal Neurological Institute.
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Activity peaked when the threat stimulus was at its closest point
(Figure 3a). The effect was significantly stronger during pursuit
plus threat of electric shock, relative to the other three task condi-
tions (Figure 3b) and resembles findings from amaze-based threat-
avoidance task (Mobbs et al., 2007, 2009). Second, activity in the
anterior hippocampus increased during goal conflict, relative to
the other three task conditions (Figure 3b, 3c). This result resem-
bles that found with a foraging task (Bach et al., 2014).
As JORT allowed us to compare brain activation across all four
task conditions within subjects, our most important result is that
we did not find significant PAG activity during goal conflict, nor
significant activity in the anterior hippocampus during pursuit
plus threat of electric shock. This pattern of results, therefore, is
consistent with a double-dissociation that supports separate find-
ings by other researchers of midbrain activation in pursuit by
threat and anterior hippocampal activation during goal conflict.
It is unclear why the anterior hippocampal circuits of our par-
ticipants deactivated during the task condition containing goal
conflict plus threat of electric shock, relative to the task condition
containing only goal conflict (Figure 3b). This condition is the
most intense form of goal conflict in JORT and, we anticipated,
would cause greater hippocampal activation than during goal con-
flict without threat of electric shock. One explanation is that during
severe threat, the neural circuits governing responses to goal
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Figure 4. Scatterplots showing effect on BOLD signal of inter-individual differences in dread elicited by threat of electric shock and also neuroticism (asmeasured by the Eysenck
Personality Questionnaire). (A, B) Right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [32, 12, 34]. (C, D) Right superior temporal gyrus [52, −12, 8]. (E, F) Left hippocampus [−22, −22, −15]. (G, H)
Operculum/right posterior insula [48, 8, −12]. Each point represents an individual’s response on the self-report measures.
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conflict (Behavioral Inhibition System [BIS]; Gray, 1976) deacti-
vate to allow an explosive, panic-based avoidance response.
Since the hippocampus is a major component of BIS (Gray &
McNaughton, 2000) and the task condition containing goal con-
flict plus threat of electric shock included two threat stimuli, it
is plausible that the threat level in this trial type was sufficiently
severe to cause anterior hippocampal deactivation. This is an issue
that may have been compounded by the intrinsic anxiety caused by
the experimental situation (the experiment-knowledge problem),
since it would havemeant that participants were already experienc-
ing hippocampal activation, even before beginning the experimen-
tal session.
This explanation is supported by our additional finding of a sig-
nificant negative association between neuroticism scores and
hippocampal activation during goal conflict plus threat of electric
shock (Figure 4e, 4f). Since neuroticism reflects sensitivity to threat
(Perkins et al., 2013), hippocampal activation should correlate neg-
atively with neuroticism, as indeed we found. However, as a caveat,
the restriction of range of neuroticism scores in this sample means
that our interpretations are tentative.
Based on this analysis and with that caveat in mind, we suggest
that during goal conflict without threat of electric shock, low and
high scorers on neuroticism both process goal conflict normally,
hence the observed tendency for greater hippocampal activation
during this task condition. But in a situation containing threat
of electric shock in addition to goal conflict, relatively threat-
sensitive participants (i.e., higher scorers on neuroticism) experi-
ence hippocampal deactivation, whereas the less threat-sensitive
participants do not and thus can process goal conflict as normal.
The notion that neuroticism is negatively related to the reten-
tion of cognitive control during threat-related goal conflict condi-
tions is backed up by two of our exploratory results – first, the
negative association between dread scores and activation in
DLPFC during the task condition containing goal conflict plus
threat of electric shock (Figure 4a, 4b); second, the finding that
the distance effect on the midbrain was the strongest in partici-
pants who reported elevated levels of dread when pursued by
threat. Since threat-generated increases in negative state affect were
associated with deactivation in DLPFC (a component of the cog-
nitive control network; Niendam et al., 2012) but with activation in
a midbrain area that is associated with primitive, panic-related
responses to threat, these findings back up previous evidence for
top-down inhibitory processes upon reactions to threat (Mobbs
et al., 2007, 2015).
More specifically, since DLPFC influences executive function-
ing and PAG panic, it follows that low scorers on neuroticism,
since these do not magnify threat, will have a higher threshold
for preserving activation in DLPFC during threat-intense goal con-
flict and thus avoiding panic. This begs the question of where these
individual differences in perceptions of threat intensity come from:
one candidate is the basolateral amygdala (BLA;Mobbs et al., 2007,
2009), suggesting that individuals who happen to possess particu-
larly reactive BLA circuits will display high scores on neuroticism
(Perkins et al., 2015). This may explain why low scorers on neu-
roticism perform better in roles that require efficient decision-
making under threat (e.g., bomb-disposal officer or fighter pilot;
Bartram &Dale, 1982; Hallam & Rachman, 1980) than individuals
with high scores on neuroticism, who will tend to suffer early
hippocampal and DLPFC deactivation and thus have a lower
threshold for panic.
Our finding of a negative relationship between EPQ neuroti-
cism scores and BOLD responses in the superior and middle
temporal gyri (Figure 4c, 4d) is consistent with previous research
(Kumari et al., 2007) which found, using an electric shock task, that
neuroticism correlated negatively with brain activity in the supe-
rior and middle temporal gyrus, extending to the hippocampus,
precuneus, putamen, thalamus, and middle occipital gyrus. Our
finding that dread scores were significantly positively correlated
with task-related activity in a cluster extending from the opercu-
lum to the posterior insula (Figure 4g, 4h) echoes previous research
(Coen et al., 2011) that found a positive correlation during the
anticipation of visceral pain between neuroticism scores and activ-
ity in the insula.
In conclusion, our results provide a small-scale pilot illustration
of the challenges that face researchers seeking to explore the asso-
ciations in healthy humans between midbrain and hippocampal
activation and flight from a pursuing threat and goal conflict,
respectively. Our most important finding was that, consistent with
earlier research, imminent threat activated the midbrain and that
this effect was significantly stronger during the simple pursuit con-
dition than during goal conflict. Our results also suggest future
studies should pay closer attention to examining and comparing
fMRI results in men and women. The complex results regarding
hippocampal activation by goal conflict show the limitations of this
approach but nevertheless suggest that ethoexperimental com-
puter tasks are useful for understanding human brain activation
during risky or threatening situations. Finally, our results contrib-
ute information to theories linking anxiety disorders to altered
functioning in defensive brain systems.
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